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Abstract 
Artificial intelligence has entered into the sphere of creativity and ingenuity. Recent headlines refer to paintings 
produced by machines, music performed or composed by algorithms or drugs discovered by computer programs. 
This paper discusses the possible implications of the development and adoption of this new technology in the 
intellectual property framework and presents the opinions expressed by practitioners and legal scholars in 
recent publications. The literature review, although not intended to be exhaustive, reveals a series of questions 
that call for further reflection. These concern the protection of artificial intelligence by intellectual property, the 
use of data to feed algorithms, the protection of the results generated by intelligent machines as well as the 
relationship between ethical requirements of transparency and explainability and the interests of rights holders. 
This report is based on a background paper to the JRC report "Artificial Intelligence: A European perspective" 
(2018). 
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1 Introduction 
Artificial intelligence1 (AI) is expected to gain a 
central role in our daily lives in the not–too-distant 
future. However, the increasing complexity and 
autonomous decision-making capacity of AI-
powered systems and their potential use across a 
variety of sectors also pose significant legal and 
regulatory challenges2. This paper concentrates on 
the impact of AI on the intellectual property (IP) 
framework, and focuses in particular on (i) the 
protection of AI as well as of the outputs generated 
by intelligent systems, and (ii) on potential tensions 
between IP protection and “Trustworthy AI”3. 
Intelligent machines are now being used for 
generating news, producing music, writing scripts 
and for drug development4. The AI strategies that 
have been adopted have not thoroughly addressed 
whether the current legal framework for IP is 
suitable for AI, and in particular how it could handle 
the outputs produced by intelligent systems5. 
However, some recent policy developments have 
shown an increasing interest in the topic.  
Back in 2017, the European Parliament called on 
the European Commission to support a horizontal 
and technologically neutral approach to IP that 
could be applied to the various sectors in which 
robotics could be employed6. In its explanatory 
statement, the European Parliament’s JURI 
Committee said there was a need ‘to come forward 
with a balanced approach to intellectual property 
rights when applied to hardware and software 
1 As highlighted by Craglia et al. 2018, AI is a generic term 
that refers to any machine or algorithm that is capable of 
observing its environment, learns, and based on the 
knowledge and experience gained, takes intelligent action 
or proposes decisions. There are many different 
technologies that fall under this broad AI definition. At the 
moment Machine Learning is the most widely used. 
2 For an overview of the main legal challenges raised by 
widespread use of AI see, among others, Craglia 2018, 
Chapter 7.  
3 On April 8 2019 the High Level Expert Group on AI 
published the “Ethics guidelines for Trustworthy AI” 
(Guidelines). Key therein is the notion of "Trustworthy AI", 
which is defined as AI that is lawful, ethical and robust. The 
Guidelines take a “human centric approach” to AI where 
fundamental human rights are identified as the foundation 
of Trustworthy AI. On the basis of fundamental rights, the 
Guidelines identify ethical principles governing AI which 
translate into seven requirements for Trustworthy AI, like 
e.g. transparency and accountability. 
4 For examples see Curzon (2019).  
5 A summary of AI strategies in the EU is presented in Craglia 
2018. See also the recent report published by the US 
Library of the Congress: Regulation of Artificial Intelligence 
in Selected Jurisdictions. 
6 European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with 
recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on 
Robotics (2015/2103(INL)). 
7 However, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy 
‘cautions against the introduction of new intellectual 
property rights in the field of robotics and artificial 
standards and codes that protect innovation and at 
the same time foster innovation’. The committee 
also demanded ‘the elaboration of criteria for “own 
intellectual creation” for copyrightable works 
produced by computers or robots’7. Finally, the 
European Parliament resolution also emphasised 
the relevance of setting up mechanisms to ensure 
interoperability, and the importance of giving 
access to source code, input data and construction 
details ‘to investigate accidents and damage 
caused by smart robots’. The Commission, in the 
communication on Artificial Intelligence for 
Europe8, stresses the need to reflect on this issue 
to foster innovation and legal certainty in a 
balanced way. As a follow-up to this 
communication, the Commission published a call 
for a study to assess whether the current IPR 
framework is fit-for-purpose for AI-generated 
works/inventions9. Analysis of this question is being 
considered at the national level. In France, for 
example, the Conseil supérieur de la propriété 
littéraire et artistique has announced a mission to 
deal with the legal and economic challenges of AI 
in the sectors of cultural creation10. In the UK, one 
of the priorities for 2019-2020 for the national IP 
office is to better understand the impact of AI on 
the global IP framework11. The United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) has recently 
published a Request for Comments on Patenting 
Artificial Intelligence Inventions12.  
intelligence that could hamper innovation and the 
exchange of expertise’, idem. 
8 EC 2018 Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
Artificial Intelligence for Europe COM(2018) 237 final 
Brussels, 25.4.2018. 
9 More info available on https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/trends-and-developments-artificial-
intelligence-challenges-intellectual-property-rights.   
10 See http://www.culture.gouv.fr/Thematiques/Propriete-
litteraire-et-artistique/Conseil-superieur-de-la-propriete-
litteraire-et-artistique/Travaux/Missions/Mission-du-
CSPLA-sur-l-intelligence-artificielle. 
In a previous report prepared by the French parliament, (C. 
De Ganay and D. Gillot, 2017), the issue of IP rights on AI-
generated assets was briefly addressed: the rapporteurs 
concluded that if IP rights were to be granted to AI-
generated works in no case should those rights be owned 
by the AI system. 
11 Intellectual Property Office Corporate Plan 2019 to 2020, 
available at:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upload
s/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/797332/Corporat
e-Plan-2019-2020.pdf.
12 Request for Comments on Patenting Artificial Intelligence
Inventions, document available for consultation on:
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/08/27/2
019-18443/request-for-comments-on-patenting-
artificial-intelligence-inventions.  
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The discussion on IP and AI is also attracting 
attention at international fora. The World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has been 
particularly active in exploring both: (i) the use of 
information and communication technology and AI 
by IP offices13; and (ii) the relevance of AI for IP 
policies14. The European Patent Office (EPO) has 
published new guidelines on the patentability of AI 
and machine learning and a series of studies on 
economic and legal issues in AI. Last but not least, 
the IP5, the five largest IP offices in the world15, 
have identified AI as a strategic priority for the near 
future16, and recently agreed to launch a task force 
on AI and emerging technologies17.  
This paper looks at the links between IP law and AI. 
It presents a literature review of the discussion on 
IP law and AI. It focuses in particular on: 
• the IP protection of AI;
• the use of data for training AI;
• the protection for creations and
inventions generated by AI;
• the interplay between explainability and
IP.
The issue of ownership and access to data, 
although of paramount importance for AI 
development, is not discussed here, since it has 
implications that go beyond the IP framework. 
13 See Meeting of Intellectual Property Offices (IPOS) on ICT 
strategies and Artificial Intelligence (AI) for IP 
administration, Geneva, May 23 to 25, 2018, 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=4
6586. During the meeting, initiatives were presented in 
areas such as: automatic patent classification; automatic 
recommendation of class for goods and services of 
trademark applications; patent prior art search and 
analytics trademark; image search trademark examination; 
helpdesk services and assisting tools for applicants; 
general administrative tasks to manage IP files; 
prosecution and formality checks; machine translation; 
linguistic tools and terminologies; and data analysis for 
economic research. 
Although the use of AI in IP administration is not without 
challenges, estimates of cost savings are promising. AI also 
offers clear opportunities for IP lawyers and applicants to 
reduce costs. The impact of the use of AI on the IP 
landscape (its impact on: registration costs, the number of 
applications, the diversity of applicants, the use of AI to 
draft applications, etc.) deserves to be further explored.  
14 Together with the UK IP Office, the WIPO recently 
organised the international conference AI: Decoding IP, 
https://orcula.com/ipo/. See also forthcoming WIPO 
Conversation on Intellectual Property (IP) and Artificial 
Intelligence (AI), provisional programme on 
https://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=5
1767. 
Spain has asked the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law 
of Patents to conduct a study on patents and IP, Standing 
Committee on the Law of Patents, Twenty-Eighth Session, 
July 9-12 2018, SCP/28/7, Proposal by the Delegation of 
Spain, available on
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=4
6439. 
15 The European Patent Office (EPO), the Japan Patent Office 
(JPO), the Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO), the 
State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic 
of China (SIPO) and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO).  
16IP5, Heads of the World’s Five Largest Intellectual 
Property Offices Meet in New Orleans, 14 June 2018 
Press Release, available on
http://www.fiveipoffices.org/news/20180615/Pressrelease.
pdf. 
17 IP5 agree to launch AI and emerging tech task force, 
http://www.ippromagazine.com/ippromagazinenews/article
.php?article_id=6795.  
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2 The IP protection of AI 
AI relies heavily on software and data. While 
software as such is not patentable, it may be 
protected by copyright and trade secrets (or even 
by patent law in the case of computer-implemented 
inventions (CIIs)) if certain requirements are met. 
There is an ongoing debate about the adequacy of 
the current IP system to cope with AI technologies18 
as well as about the implications of AI for existing 
standards of patentability. The following 
paragraphs review the key requirements for 
protection of AI by patent and copyright law. 
Patent protection for AI 
A recent EPO study notes that AI has been one of 
the fastest growing Fourth Industrial Revolution19 
(4IR) fields since 2011, with an average annual 
growth rate of 43% and 83 patent applications in 
2016 (EPO, 2017). However, the increased pace of 
patent applications is confronted with a number of 
legal uncertainties. A sample of patent-protection 
issues for AI that consistently appear across 
jurisdictions and societies are provided in this 
section.   
(i) Eligible subject matter
For several years now, the courts have struggled 
with the issue of whether to grant patents in new 
fields of invention, particularly computer software 
(Kohlhepp, 2008). The eligibility of software, 
including AI software, to receive patent protection 
is an intricate issue. Generally, computer programs 
"as such" are excluded from patentability at the 
EPO (Article 52(2)(c) and (3) of the European Patent 
Convention (EPC)), but the exclusion does not apply 
to computer programs having a technical character 
(cf. producing a ‘further technical effect’ when run 
18 When discussing the patentability of AI, Firth-Butterfield 
and Chae (2018a), in the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
white paper Artificial Intelligence Collides with Patent Law, 
highlight the need to assess the objectives of patent law, 
including the promotion of innovation and dissemination. 
The white paper also stresses the role patent law plays in 
incentivising new inventions. As such, it is important to 
judge whether granting patents on AI inventions promote 
or stifle innovation, and whether AI may be more efficiently 
protected in an alternative manner, such as through 
copyright or trade secrets law. The white paper stresses 
the need to consider AI-specific factors rather than broad, 
software-specific factors when assessing whether 
incentivising AI through patents has a distinct economic, 
social and ethical impact on possible legal developments. 
Firth-Butterfield and Chae further suggest the following: 
Lowering the subject-matter patentability standard for AI 
inventions relating to areas deemed more socially 
beneficial, such as healthcare, the environment, criminal 
justice and education, might be one way to help balance 
promoting innovation with mitigating ethical concerns 
(Firth-Butterfield and Chae, 2018a). 
on a computer (as described in the Guidelines for 
Examination (GL) under section G – II 3.3.6)).  
In 2018, the EPO included a new sub-section (G – II 
3.3.1) on patentability of AI and machine learning 
(ML) in its GL that has been updated in 2019. The
new section indicates that 'AI and machine learning
are based on computational models and algorithms
…, which are considered to be per se of an abstract
mathematical nature, irrespective of whether they
can be ‘trained’ based on training data'. It further
mentions that the guidance provided for
mathematical methods (GL G-II 3.3) can be used
for such computational models and algorithms. As
in the case of computer programs, mathematical
methods are excluded from patentability under
Article 52(2)(a) EPC when claimed "as such"’ (Article
52(3) EPC)’. The GL further clarify that ‘the
exclusion applies if a claim is directed to a purely
abstract mathematical method and the claim does
not require any technical means.’ In its 2019
update, the GL draw special attention to the clarity
of terms used in claims related to mathematical
methods as they are of the opinion that ‘this is of
particular importance where such terms are used in
significantly different ways in the application itself
and/or in relevant prior art documents, as this may
be an indicator that the terms have no well-
recognised meaning and may leave the reader in
doubt as to the meaning of the technical features
to which they refer, which may lead to findings of
lack of technical character of the claims’.
The GL further mention that ‘if a claim is directed 
either to a method involving the use of technical 
means (e.g. a computer) or to a device, its subject-
matter has a technical character as a whole and is 
thus not excluded from patentability.’ When 
19 The Fourth Industrial Revolution is a term firstly used by 
Klaus Schwab, founder and Executive Chairman of the 
World Economic Forum, to designate the transformation 
being brought to our society by recent technological 
innovation in certain fields –notably AI but also robotics, he 
Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, 3-D printing, 
nanotechnology, biotechnology, materials science, energy 
storage, and quantum computing are bringing to our 
society. According to the author The First Industrial 
Revolution used water and steam power to mechanize 
production. The Second used electric power to create mass 
production. The Third used electronics and information 
technology to automate production. Now a Fourth 
Industrial Revolution is building on the Third, the digital 
revolution that has been occurring since the middle of the 
last century. It is characterized by a fusion of technologies 
that is blurring the lines between the physical, digital, and 
biological spheres. In ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution, 
What It Means and How to Respond’, Foreign affairs, 
December 12, 2015,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-
12/fourth-industrial-revolution.  
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examining whether the claimed subject-matter has 
a technical character as a whole, the EPO recalls 
that certain expressions such as ‘support vector 
machine’, ‘reasoning engine’ or ‘neural network’ 
must be looked at carefully, because they usually 
refer to abstract models devoid of technical 
character. However in its 2019 update, it is clarified 
that these terms ‘may, depending on the context, 
merely refer to abstract models or algorithms and 
thus not, on their own; necessarily imply the use of 
a technical means. This has to be taking into 
account when examining whether the claimed 
subject matter has a technical character as a 
whole20.  
 
According to the examination guidelines for 
mathematical methods ‘once it is established that 
the claimed subject-matter as a whole is an 
invention, it is then examined in respect of the other 
requirements of patentability, in particular novelty 
and inventive step. For the assessment of inventive 
step, all features which contribute to the technical 
character of the invention must be taken into 
account. When the claimed invention is based on a 
mathematical method, it is assessed whether the 
mathematical method contributes to the technical 
character of the invention. A mathematical method 
may contribute to the technical character of an 
invention, i.e. contribute to producing a technical 
effect that serves a technical purpose, by: i) its 
application to a field of technology, and/or ii) being 
adapted to a specific technical implementation (T 
2330/13).’ The specific criteria for assessing these 
two situations are explained further in the GL. 
 
The EPO guidelines give following favourable 
examples of patentable subject matter of AI and 
ML applications 'the use of a neural network in a 
heart-monitoring apparatus for the purpose of 
identifying irregular heartbeats makes a technical 
contribution. The classification of digital images, 
videos, audio or speech signals based on low-level 
features (e.g. edges or pixel attributes for images) 
are further typical technical applications of 
classification algorithms'. On the other hand, the 
guidelines state that the following applications 
would likely not be patentable 'Classifying text 
documents solely in respect of their textual content 
is however not regarded to be per se a technical 
purpose but a linguistic one (T 1358/09). 
Classifying abstract data records or even 
‘telecommunication network data records’ without 
                                           
20  'Guidelines for Examination, G-II 3.3.1, Artificial intelligence 
and machine learning', European Patent Office (EPO), 2019 
update 
21  Note that according to Rogitz (2019) the Japan Patent 
Office (in their recently added ten new case examples 
pertinent to artificial intelligence-related technology to 
Annex A of the Examination Handbook for Patent and 
any indication of a technical use being made of the 
resulting classification is also not per se a technical 
purpose, even if the classification algorithm may be 
considered to have valuable mathematical 
properties such as robustness (T 1784/06)'. 
 
The 2019 GL update states that, for mathematical  
methods, ‘merely specifying the technical nature of 
data may not be sufficient on its own to define an 
invention (even if the resulting method would not 
be considered a purely abstract mathematical 
method as such, it may still fall under the excluded 
category of methods for performing mental acts as 
such if no use of technical means is implied)’. 
However, in relation to AI they do state 'where a 
classification method serves a technical purpose, 
the steps of generating the training set and training 
the classifier may also contribute to the technical 
character of the invention if they support achieving 
that technical purpose.' Jones (2018) suggests this 
may enable the possibility of ‘obtaining European 
patent protection for a method of training an AI or 
machine learning algorithm, or to a method of 
generating training data for this purpose, if it is 
possible to credibly (or plausibly) link the method to 
a reliable and repeatable technical effect’. With 
this, ‘plausibility’ seems to be introduced, which is 
an aspect of patent law that is usually encountered 
in the pharmaceutical and life science field21.   
 
(ii) Sufficiency of disclosure 
 
Article 83 of the EPC requires that a European 
patent application shall disclose the invention in a 
manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be 
carried out by ‘a person skilled in the art’. In 
exchange for this disclosure, a limited exclusive 
right is provided which is the core of the patent 
system. During the EPO’s conference on patenting 
AI22, it was mentioned that there needs to be 
sufficient disclosure of AI innovations to avoid 
decisions being taken by ‘black boxes’, and that 
patent offices therefore had an important role to 
play. In a report of the IP5 expert round table on AI 
it is further mentioned that the extent of the 
disclosure depends on what is claimed and that the 
‘IP5 offices have strict disclosure requirements, 
whereby an overly strict application might 
discourage companies from pursuing patent 
Utility Model (January 2019)) come to suggest that novel 
input data and output data may be sufficient to establish 
an inventive step when seeking patent protection in Japan.  
22  European Patent Office (EPO), EPO hosts first conference 
on patenting artificial intelligence, (30 May 2018), 
available at: https://www.epo.org/news-
issues/news/2018/20180530.html. 
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protection and resort to use trade secret protection 
instead’23. 
 
Although, nothing is said specifically on how to 
address clarity and sufficiency of disclosure (Article 
83 of EPC) for AI inventions in the recent updates 
of the EPO Guidelines for Examination (GL), GL F-
III, 1(4), on sufficiency of disclosure, stipulates that 
'…for the requirements of Article 83 and of Rule 
42(1)(c) and Rule 42(1)(e) of the EPC to be fully 
satisfied, it is necessary that the invention is 
described not only in terms of its structure but also 
in terms of its function, unless the functions of the 
various parts are immediately apparent. Indeed, in 
some technical fields (e.g. computers), a clear 
description of function may be much more 
appropriate than an over-detailed description of 
structure'. 
 
Because AI inventions usually fall into the category 
of CIIs22, it could be assumed that minimum 
requirements for sufficiency of disclosure are at 
the same level as for computer-implemented 
inventions in general. However, as indicated in the 
AIPLA/AIPPI/FICPI AI colloquium primer (AI 
Colloquium primer, 2019) 'Additional problems may 
arise if an invention relying on AI technology is 
claimed but it is not explained in detail how the AI 
technology is brought to a working example. This 
often involves specific training or other 
adjustments. For example, if an AI technology is 
implemented in the form of a neural network, it 
may be necessary to describe in detail the network 
topology and how the weights are set. This was the 
case in T 0521/95, wherein the Board concluded 
that the application did not give specific 
information required to set up the network. 
However, in that case the network topology was 
considered to be new and based on recent 
physiological research, and to not be known to a 
person skilled in the art'. 
 
According to WIPO’s background document on 
patents and emerging technologies24, another issue 
might arise from the fact that ‘deep learning 
technologies are non-deterministic: they involve 
some randomized initialization. Therefore, even the 
same training data and the same neural network 
                                           
23  Report from the IP5 expert round table on artificial 
intelligence, October 31st 2018, available at: 
https://www.fiveipoffices.org/wcm/connect/fiveipoffices/5e
2c753c-54ff-4c38-861c-
9c7b896b2d44/IP5+roundtable+on+AI_report_22052019
.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID= 
24  Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Thirtieth 
Session Geneva, June 24 to 27, 2019, ‘BACKGROUND 
DOCUMENT ON PATENTS AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES’, 
available at: 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_30/scp_30_
5.pdf. 
architecture might lead to slightly different 
performance of machine learning’. It further 
compares the similarity of this non-deterministic 
character to that of biological materials, and 
mentions that ‘consideration might be given to the 
so-called reproducibility or plausibility of the 
claimed inventions based on the disclosure in a 
patent application’. Likewise Read (2019) recalls 
that ‘AI and ML are not CIIs generally, particularly 
where the computer learns, the behaviour and 
hence a description of the computer is dynamic 
until training is terminated and is likely to be 
unpredictable’. He compares the challenges and 
requirements on sufficiency for AI and ML 
inventions to that of the technical fields of 
chemistry and biology, and is of the opinion that 
many elements (like e.g. plausibility, use of a 
depository, etc.), may be readily transposed to 
inventions based on AI and ML.  
 
Finally, the Japan Patent Office has recently issued 
ten new case examples pertinent to artificial 
intelligence-related technology to Annex A of its 
Examination Handbook for Patent and Utility Model 
(January 2019), which contains amongst others 
several concrete examples regarding the 
application of the disclosure requirements to AI-
related inventions25. Rogitz (2019) gives an 
overview of the main takeaways for the description 
requirements and indicates that, when filing AI 
patent applications in Japan, one should disclose a 
“certain relation, such as a correlation” that an AI-
related invention might make, and that for certain 
AI inventions disclosure of test results or validation 
of the AI model are required ‘unless an estimation 
result by AI can be a substitution for an evaluation 
on a product that has actually been made’.  
 
Copyright protection for AI software 
 
As computer programmes, AI systems may be 
granted copyright protection available for original 
software. However, copyright protection only 
extends to the original expression of the computer 
programme and not to the ideas and principles 
underlying it26. Thus ‘to the extent that logic, 
algorithms and programming languages comprise 
ideas and principles, those ideas and principles are 
25  See the JPO guidelines, available at: 
https://www.jpo.go.jp/e/system/laws/rule/guideline/patent/
ai_jirei_e.html 
26  According to Article 1(2) of the Directive 2009/24/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
on the legal protection of computer programs (Codified 
version) (hereinafter Software Directive), protection ‘shall 
apply to the expression in any form of a computer program. 
Ideas and principles which underlie any element of a 
computer program, including those which underlie its 
interfaces, are not protected by copyright under this 
Directive.’ 
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not protected’27. Therefore, only the expression is to 
be protected by copyright. This means that the code 
of the algorithm, if original, can be protected while 
the pure concept behind the algorithm cannot. 
 
IP protection for data used in AI 
 
AI systems are highly dependent on data to train 
intelligent algorithms. These data may be protected 
by third-party rights, and AI developers may 
therefore need to acquire permission to access and 
use those data (see next section). To further 
complicate matters, processing, cleaning and 
annotation activities are often carried out on the 
original datasets by AI developers to ensure data 
adequacy, and these activities may trigger new 
rights. Data annotations may indeed be a valuable 
resource for future users of the same or a different 
AI system. 
 
Curated data libraries may or may not deserve IP 
protection on their own. There is no legal or 
statutory title providing for ownership of data. At 
most, under certain circumstances data could 
become protected by the database’s sui generis 
right. This specific protection is triggered when a 
substantial investment has been made in obtaining, 
verifying or presenting the contents of a database. 
If annotated data takes the form of a database28, 
                                           
27  Recital 11, Software Directive. 
28  Legally defined as ‘a collection of independent works, data 
or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical 
way and individually accessible by electronic or other 
means’, Article 1 of the Database Directive. However, J. 
Buyers notes that ‘it is improbable that such [training] 
and the making of this database has entailed 
substantial investment (either in financial or human 
resources, for example) the annotated dataset 
could be subject to the sui generis right. The sui 
generis right does not enter into play when an 
investment is made in the creation of data. 
However, in the specific case of annotated datasets 
it might well be considered that the investment is 
not made in the creation but in the verification of 
the data. Where the collection of annotated data 
does not reach the investment threshold, AI 
developers will probably rely on trade secrets29 to 
protect their investments. Or rather, they will rely 
on contracts to regulate access, use and reuse of 
the compilation of processed and annotated 
datasets or the trained models. 
 
In cases where the processed and annotated 
dataset incorporates individual works (e.g. pictures 
deserving copyright protection) or a protected 
subject-matter (substantial part of a database 
deserving sui generis protection), it will depend on 
the specific case whether the annotated dataset (or 
even the trained system) is considered as a 
derivative work/subject-matter (on this see also 
Margoni 2018). In cases where individual works or 
subject-matter are not per se reproduced (i.e. where 
only information about those is included), one could 
in principle conclude that the final results should 
not be considered as a derivative. 
datasets would reach the level of organisation equivalent 
to a classically ordered database’, Buyers 2018.  
29  Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of 
undisclosed know-how and business information (trade 
secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and 
disclosure, OJ L 157. 
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3 Copyright and the use of data for training AI 
Data digitisation and data availability have been 
one of the key drivers of the most recent 
developments in AI. Most promising AI techniques, 
such as machine learning or deep learning, are 
highly dependent on large amounts of data. Millions 
of images, texts, videos, sounds, and raw data are 
required to feed and train AI systems. 
 
In this section, we explore the use of data in AI 
models through the lens of copyright law. The issue 
of access to data is not a copyright issue and, 
although very much relevant for AI, it is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Here, the term ‘data’ is used in 
a broad sense, including informational items that 
could be protected by copyright (such as images, 
videos or text) and items that are not necessarily 
copyright protected, such as pure raw data. 
However, the latter may deserve protection through 
the sui generis right granted to database makers30. 
In principle, when data are protected by copyright 
or the sui generis right, any temporary or 
permanent reproduction of these data or the 
extraction and reuse of a substantial part of the 
data contained in a protected database would need 
the authorisation of the rightholder, unless an 
exception applies. Often, the use of data to feed AI 
algorithms will require accessing and processing, 
and therefore very likely reproducing, materials 
that might be protected by copyright or by the 
database maker’s sui generis right. In many cases, 
AI developers may collect data from commercial 
and structured publications and databases. In many 
other cases, data collection may also involve the 
scraping of publicly available websites that, despite 
being freely accessible, may be equally protected 
by copyright or the sui generis right. 
 
                                           
30  It has been assumed that machine generated data are not 
protected by the database maker's sui generis right. This is 
indeed one of the conclusions reached in the recent 
Evaluation of the Database Directive, in line with some 
representatives of the doctrine. This view is mainly 
supported by the restrictive interpretation given by the 
CJEU in its landmark cases on the sui generis right. All in 
all, the Commission recognises the need to monitor the 
possible application of database law in the context of the 
data economy.   
31  Another exception relevant for TDM is the exception 
provided in Article 5(1) of the Directive 2001/29/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the information society (hereinafter 
Infosoc Directive) on temporary reproductions. However, 
when analysing the application of this article to machine 
learning and natural language processing, Margoni comes 
to the conclusion that although temporary copies created 
in the preparation of annotated datasets and trained 
models are likely to be covered by the exception, there are 
certain acts, notably the permanent copies that may be 
stored at the end of the process, that naturally fall beyond 
its scope (Margoni 2018). 
In this context, copyright exceptions, and in 
particular exceptions allowing text and data mining 
(hereinafter TDM), become relevant31. TDM has 
been defined as ‘any automated analytical 
technique aimed at analysing text and data in 
digital form in order to generate information which 
includes but is not limited to patterns, trends and 
correlations’32 — a definition that would come to 
describe many routine operations in the 
development of AI. 
 
With the advent of the data economy, there has 
been a polarised discussion around the legal regime 
for TDM and the most appropriate shape of TDM 
exceptions33. Some scholars have argued that TDM 
should not be considered as relevant to copyright 
law since it is not an exploitation of the work34. 
However, the more widely accepted opinion is that 
often TDM may involve some copying that is 
covered by the exclusive rights35, and that TDM 
therefore requires the permission of the copyright 
holders unless an exception applies. 
 
To overcome the legal uncertainty about TDM, in 
2016 the Commission tabled a legislative proposal 
for a new Directive on copyright and related rights 
in the Digital Single Market36 that provided for a 
mandatory copyright exception allowing TDM by 
research organisations with legal access to the 
works or databases concerned for scientific 
research37. The new exception concern both 
copyright and database sui generis rights38. Some 
commentators expressed concern about the impact 
of this exception on European competitiveness, in 
particular by excluding commercial undertakings, 
start-ups and unaffiliated researchers39. These 
commentators worried that the exception would 
32  Article 2 of the Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market 
and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC 
(hereinafter CDSM Directive). 
33  See among others Triaille, 2014; Guibault, 2016; Geiger et 
al, 2018a and b; and all the other authors cited in this 
section. 
34  ECS, 2017; Hilty and Richter, 2017; Senftleben 2018. 
35  In this line Guibault, 2016; Geiger et al, 2018a and b; 
Rosati, 2018; Triaille, 2014. 
36  Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related 
rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 
96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC (hereinafter CDSM Directive). 
37  Article 3 of the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital 
Single Market, COM/2016/0593 final, EC 2016. 
38  Íd. 
39  It goes without saying that these TDM techniques, like 
many AI-powered systems, may be applied in very 
different for-profit and not-for-profit contexts, across 
sectors (from research organisations to start-ups), and by 
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prevent activities that could be considered lawful 
under other regimes, notably in the US under fair 
use, but also in Canada, Israel or Japan (Geiger et 
al., 2018b; Samuelson, 2018). Thus, a number of 
authors recommended introducing more flexibility 
into European copyright law, either through a more 
generous provision40 or through an open norm41. 
 
The provision evolved in its passage through the 
Council and Parliament. AI had been gaining 
prominence in the policy debate, and its potential 
to improve innovation was being recognised. 
Against this background, it was finally agreed to 
expand the scope of the exception so that it would 
also apply to cultural heritage institutions42. It was 
                                           
different actors (from big companies to journalists or 
citizens). 
40  Professors from the CEIPI suggested expanding the scope 
of TDM exceptions to all those enjoying lawful access or at 
least to certain categories of beneficiaries such as 
journalists, even if this is done against a fair remuneration 
when the use is commercial (Geiger at al., 2018a). The Max 
Planck Institute (MPI) proposed a general exception 
authorising TDM by those having access to the work or 
subject matter coupled with an obligation upon the 
rightholders ‘to provide research organisations with 
datasets that enable them to carry out text and data 
mining only’ whether or not in exchange for a reasonable 
payment (Hilty and Richter, 2017). Also Senftleben 
defended an open exception for TDM, except for those 
cases implying an exploitation of the commercial value of 
source data. In his view, this would greatly support start-
ups active in big data (Senftleben, 2017). 
41  As argued by Geiger et al., an open norm would not only 
accommodate TDM uses but also allow to cope with the 
also agreed to include a second exception or 
limitation43 that would allow TDM by other entities 
(such as private companies) for commercial and 
non-commercial purposes, provided rightholders 
have not reserved this right by appropriate 
means44. For content made publicly available on 
line, it should only be considered appropriate to 
reserve those rights by the use of machine readable 
means, including metadata and the terms and 
conditions of a website or a service45. This would 
allow web mining, provided the remaining 
conditions of the exception are met. The Directive, 
as finally adopted, clarifies that other uses should 
not be affected by the reservation of rights for the 
purposes of TDM46.   
pace of technological developments. See also Schönberger, 
who explores alternative ways to allow this use of data, 
such as through the recourse to implicit consent, or a new 
reading of the private use exception. Schafer et al. had 
previously advocated for a machine-learning exception 
that would allow robots to use (and then copy) protected 
works or subject matter they legally have access to in the 
same way that humans do (i.e. in their own memory) 
(Schafer et al. 2015). 
42  Article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society (hereinafter CDSM 
Directive). 
43  In such cases, Member States may provide for 
compensation. 
44  Article 4 of the CDSM Directive. 
45  Recital 18 of the CDSM Directive. 
46  Recital 18 CDSM Directive. 
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4 IP protection for assets generated by AI 
As has been widely reported in the media, AI is 
being used to generate news47, compose music48, 
create artworks (some of which have actually been 
sold in auctions49), and produce scripts50. It has 
even been used to come up with technical 
inventions that, if made by humans, could be 
patentable51. Recent achievements in AI techniques 
have allowed machines to reach a level of 
autonomy that could make the human contribution 
trivial to the creative or inventive process. We may 
be entering into an era where machines will not 
only assist humans in the creative process but 
create or invent all by themselves. The application 
of the IP legal framework to the works or inventions 
generated by AI is a complex question, in particular 
for: (a) copyright and other sui generis or 
neighbouring rights; and (b) patent law. 
The following table includes a set of examples of 
currently existing AI systems that are challenging 
the notions of IP law. 
Name Category of possible IP 
protection if generated by a 
natural person 
Description 
Next Rembrandt36 Copyright The Next Rembrandt is a computer-generated 3-D–printed painting 
developed by a facial-recognition-based AI algorithm that uses 
scanned data from known paintings by the Dutch painter. An AI-
generated portrait consists of 148 million pixels, and is based on 
168,263 fragments from Rembrandt’s works stored in a purpose-built 
database. 
Source: https://www.nextrembrandt.com/ & 
https://thenextrembrandt.pr.co/130454-the-next-rembrandt 
Text-generating 
programmes 
Copyright There are several text-generating programmes in use. One example is 
the programme of Stanford PhD student Andrej Karpathy, that teaches 
a neural network how to read text and compose sentences in a specific 
style, for example Wikipedia articles and lines of dialogue that 
resemble the language of Shakespeare. 
Source: Andrej Karapathy’s blog 
http://karpathy.github.io/2015/05/21/rnn-effectiveness/  
47 According to the Wikipedia entry on automated journalism 
‘StatSheet, an online platform covering college basketball, 
runs entirely on an automated program.[4] The Associated 
Press began using automation to cover 10,000 minor 
baseball leagues games annually, using a program from 
Automated Insights and statistics from MLB Advanced 
Media. Outside of sports, the Associated Press also uses 
automation to produce stories on corporate earnings. In 
2006, Thomson Reuters announced their switch to 
automation to generate financial news stories on its online 
news platform. More famously, an algorithm called 
Quakebot published a story about a 2014 California 
earthquake on The Los Angeles Times website within three 
minutes after the shaking had stopped.’ ‘Automated 
journalism’, Wikipedia, 
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automated_journalism. 
48 ‘More Artists Are Writing Songs in the Key of AI’, Wired, 
5.17.18, https://www.wired.com/story/music-written-by-
artificial-intelligence/. 
49 Among others the well-known ‘Next Rembrandt’ project 
https://www.nextrembrandt.com/; on the selling of AI 
artworks see: ‘ Why One Collector Bought a Work of Art 
Made by Artificial Intelligence—and Is Open to Acquiring 
More’, Artnet news, 3.4.18, https://news.artnet.com/art-
world/art-made-by-artificial-intelligence-1258745 or 
‘Google’s ‘Inceptionism’ Art Sells Big at San Francisco 
Auction’, artnet news, 3.2.16
https://news.artnet.com/market/google-inceptionism-art-
sells-big-439352. An AI artwork was sold at Christie’s for 
$432 500 as reported here 
https://www.christies.com/features/A-collaboration-
between-two-artists-one-human-one-a-machine-9332-
1.aspx.
50 ‘IBM Watson creates the first AI-made film trailer — and 
it’s incredibly creepy’, Wired, 2.9.16 
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/ibm-watson-ai-film-trailer;. 
See also, Sunspring, the first film entirely written by AI 
according to
http://www.thereforefilms.com/sunspring.html. 
51 ‘How artificial intelligence is changing drug discovery’, 
Spotlight, Nature 557, S55-S57 (2018), doi: 
10.1038/d41586-018-05267-x. 
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Aiva Copyright Aiva is capable of composing soundtracks for films, video games, 
commercials and any type of entertainment content. Its AI is taught 
by reading through a large collection of music partitions, written by 
the greatest composers (such as Mozart, Beethoven, and Bach) to 
create a mathematical model representation. This mathematic model 
is then used (by Aiva) to write and compose new music. Recently, Aiva 
became the first virtual artist to have her creations registered with an 
author’s rights society (cf. Société des auteurs, compositeurs et 
éditeurs de musique in France). 
Source: https://www.aiva.ai/about & https://aibusiness.com/aiva-is-
the-first-ai-to-officially-be-recognised-as-a-composer/  
DABUS, a type of 
“Creativity machine” 
Patent DABUS is a patented AI system created by Stephen Thaler, which is a 
particular type of connectionist AI. Such systems contain two neural 
networks: (i) one neural network, comprising a series of smaller neural 
networks, that generates novel ideas in response to self-perturbations 
of connection weights between neurons and component neural nets 
therein, and (ii) a second that monitors the first network and identifies 
those ideas that are sufficiently novel compared to the machine’s pre-
existing knowledge base. DABUS can bootstrap itself from a blank 
slate, both learning and creating as it goes. Two inventions generated 
by DABUS, cf. fractal container and neural flame, are described and 
filed as patent applications that are currently pending.  
Source: http://artificialinventor.com/patent-applications/ & 
http://imagination-engines.com/iei_dabus.php & WEF online article by 
Firth-Butterfield et al (2018b) 
John Koza’s 
“Invention machine” 
Patent John Koza is the initiator of genetic programming, a revolutionary 
approach to AI,  solving technical problems with virtually no human 
guidance and without following a preordained routine. For example, 
his Invention machine, using 1000 networked computers, has 
automated the creative process and designed antennae, circuits, and 
lenses. Moreover, his Invention machine has even earned a US patent 
for developing a system to make factories more efficient, one of the 
first IP protections ever granted to a non-human designer. However, 
the involvement of AI technologies was not disclosed to the US Patent 
& Trademark Office and only humans were listed as inventors. 
Source: See Carnet et al (2016) & WEF online article by Firth-
Butterfield et al (2018b) 
 
 
(a) Copyright 
 
AI-generated works in copyright legislation 
 
In the copyright realm, certain countries, such as 
the UK, South Africa, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, and 
New Zealand, have set up laws that can provide 
protection for computer-generated works. This 
protection would be granted to the person who set 
up the arrangements necessary for the creation of 
the work. 
 
In the UK, computer-generated works are defined 
as works ‘generated by computer in circumstances 
such that there is no human author of the work’. 
Note that UK provisions leave room for ownership 
                                           
52  The only relevant case being Nova Production Ltd. V. 
Mazooma Games, [2007] EWCA Civ 219, [2007] Bus LR 
1032. 
to be allocated either to the programmer or to the 
user. To our knowledge, case-law on computer-
generated works is scarce52. These works benefit 
from a shorter term of protection (50 years 
compared to the 70 years for other copyright-
protected works)53. The configuration of the right 
somewhat resembles a neighbouring right (Bently, 
2018). 
 
In those countries where no specific regime exists, 
it is questionable whether AI-generated works 
benefit from copyright protection. Can AI-created 
works be considered original? To whom should 
ownership be allocated? 
 
53  According to S. 12.7 UK copyright, ‘if the work is computer-
generated the above provisions […] copyright expires at the 
end of the period of 50 years from the end of the calendar 
year in which the work was made’. 
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Most copyright legislation across EU Member 
States is very much dependent on human-centred 
concepts, for: (i) the beneficiary of protection (i.e. 
the author); (ii) the conditions for protection (e.g. 
originality); and (iii) the rights granted (economic, 
but also moral rights). This human-centred focus is 
also present in the acquis communautaire, 
although arguably to lesser extent due to the lack 
of regulation on moral rights. 
 
Both the Software Directive and the Database 
Directive define authorship on the basis of the 
natural person(s) or group(s) of natural persons 
who created the work54. This anthropocentric 
approach also applies for the definition of 
originality. Although the concept of originality is not 
clearly defined in European law, several directives 
link originality to natural persons or human 
attributes. The Resale Directive arguably points to 
persons (‘artists’)55 and the Copyright Term 
Directive points to human attributes 
(‘personality’)56. In addition, both the Software and 
Database Directives (as a well as the Term 
Directive in relation to photographs) refer to the 
‘author’s own intellectual creation’ as the sole 
criterion to consider when assessing originality57. 
This subjective dimension has arguably been 
harmonised by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union to all copyright-protected works in a series of 
landmark decisions. In these decisions, the Court 
refers to the ‘authors’ intellectual creation’, ‘the 
free creative choices’, ‘the authors’ personality’, or 
‘the author’s personal touch’58 as requirements for 
the emergence of a copyright-protected work. 
 
The outcome is similar under US law. The US 
Copyright Act protects original works of authorship 
and, to qualify as a work of authorship, a work must 
be created by a human being. The general guide to 
the policies and procedures of the US Copyright 
Office is also clear in this regard: ‘the Office will not 
register works produced by a machine or mere 
mechanical process that operates randomly or 
                                           
54  Although company authorship is provided for if this is 
designated as the author by national law. See Article 2 of 
Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of 
computer programs (Codified version), OJ L 111 (also 
referred here as Software Directive) and Article 4 of 
Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal OJ L 77, (the 
Database Directive). 
55  Article 2 of Directive 2001/84/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on 
the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original 
work of art, OJ L 272 (the Resale Directive). 
56  Recital 16 of Directive 2006/116/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
the term of protection of copyright and certain related 
rights (codified version) OJ L 372 (the Copyright Term 
Directive). 
automatically without any creative input or 
intervention from a human author’59. China has 
taken a similar position: a recent decision by the 
court of Beijing has refused copyright protection to 
a report generated by an AI system on similar 
grounds (Chen 2019). 
 
In recent articles and public presentations, 
European scholars have debated the possible 
protection of AI-generated works under current 
European and national legislation in the context of 
this humanist approach to copyright law. Most 
authors conclude that, under present law, AI-
generated works might not be eligible for copyright 
protection. This is because works created solely by 
machines cannot be considered original in the 
sense of copyright law since they will be lacking of 
the human attributes required by case law. 
 
Are changes in the legal framework necessary? 
 
Assuming that AI-generated works do not fall under 
the protection granted by current copyright 
legislation, it should be assessed whether there 
really is a need to protect them. Any answer to this 
question would require a careful examination of the 
rationale for protection. Is there a market failure? Is 
there a need to create incentives? Any answer 
would also require an assessment of the possible 
effects that protection might have on the market 
for creative works and on innovation. If it is 
concluded that such a right should be created, 
consideration should be given to how this right 
should be defined and implemented. To our 
knowledge, no economic research has been 
published in this field. The subject has nevertheless 
been addressed by legal scholars. 
Legal experts have opposing views on this subject. 
Guadamuz (2017) has argued that a UK-like 
system would easily address this problem, and said 
that refusing to grant copyright protection to AI-
generated works could have a ‘serious commercial 
57  See Article 3 of the Database Directive, Article 1(3) of the 
Software Directive, and Article 6 of the Copyright Term 
Directive on photographs. 
Infopaq: C-5/08 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) 
of 16 July 2009; BSA: C-393/09, Judgment of the Court 
(Third Chamber) of 22 December 2010; Panier: C-145/10, 
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 1 December 
2011; Dataco: Case 604/10, Judgment of the Court, (Third 
Chamber) of 1 March 2012. In the legal assessment of the 
Panier case, Advocate General Trstenjak affirms ‘…only 
human creations are therefore protected, which can also 
include those for which the person employs a technical aid, 
such as a camera’. 
59  The Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices: 
Chapter 300, S. 313.2 
https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/chap300/ch300-
copyrightable-authorship.pdf. 
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effect’ particularly in the area of databases. He said 
that the UK system has clear advantages:  
 
It would bring certainty to an uncertain legal 
area; it has already been implemented 
internationally in various countries; it is 
ambiguous enough to deflect the 
user/programmer dichotomy question and 
have it analysed on a case-by-case basis; 
and it has been in existence for a relatively 
long time without much incident.  
 
Yet, UK provisions have not been exempted from 
criticism by other scholars who do not consider 
them to be fully appropriate for dealing with all 
kinds of computer-generated works (Bently et al. 
2018, Dickenson et al. 2017; Lambert 2017; 
Lauber-Rönsberg and Hetmank 2019). The first 
criticism raised by these scholars is that these 
provisions put too much emphasis on the distinction 
between assisted and non-assisted creations. The 
second criticism they raise is that these UK 
provisions leave a considerable margin of 
uncertainty about the person who made the 
arrangements for the creation, especially for highly 
sophisticated systems. Their third criticism is that 
the UK provisions do not address the issue of 
originality. Their fourth criticism is that the UK 
provisions do not solve the problem of creations 
jointly generated by computers and humans. Their 
final criticism is that it is questionable whether the 
UK provisions are compliant with the EU acquis. 
 
A third group of commentators has discussed the 
possible need to incentivise the creation or 
commercialisation of AI-generated works. Although 
these commentators are reluctant to grant 
copyright protection to works generated by AI, they 
still think that alternative protection should be put 
in place. Ramalho (2017) argues for a solution 
based on a public-domain approach combined with 
a ‘disseminator right’, very much inspired by the 
protection granted to publishers of unpublished 
                                           
60  Article 4 of the Copyright Term Directive reads: ‘Any person 
who, after the expiry of copyright protection, for the first 
time lawfully publishes or lawfully communicates to the 
public a previously unpublished work, shall benefit from a 
protection equivalent to the economic rights of the author. 
The term of protection of such rights shall be 25 years 
from the time when the work was first lawfully published 
or lawfully communicated to the public.’ 
61  Together with copyright, there exists a series of 
neighbouring or sui generis rights generally granted on the 
recognition of the investment made in the subject matter. 
This is the case for neighbouring rights granted to audio-
visual producers or database makers. Cruquenaire et al. 
(2017:228) have also evoked the possibility of having 
certain AI-generated works protected by the sui generis 
rights of the Database Directive in light of the recent 
jurisprudence of the CJEU concerning the expanded notion 
of ‘database’. Esterbauer, Case C490/14, Judgment of the 
Court (Second Chamber), 29 October 2015. 
works under the Copyright Term Directive60. In the 
US, Samuelson, writing in 1985, concluded that 
ownership of computer-generated works should be 
allocated to users (Samuelson 1985). Bridy (2016), 
Yanisky et al. (2017) and Pearlman (2018) have 
defended the implementation of the work-for-hire 
doctrine to AI systems. Ginsburg (2018) plays with 
the idea of granting a sui generis or neighbouring 
right61. Sui generis protection is also considered as 
a potential option to be assessed by De Cock 
(2018), Lauber-Rönsberg (2019), Saiz (2019). The 
latter suggests that in case there is evidence for the 
creation of a new right, inspiration should be taken 
from industrial property rights that, different from 
copyright, normally require registration.  
 
However, other authors have argued that there is a 
lack of empirical evidence supporting the need to 
create new property rights. Some of these authors 
favour excluding AI-generated works from any IP 
protection, so that such works would simply fall into 
the public domain (Perry & Margoni, 2018; 
Schönberger, 2018). Other authors with similar 
views instead suggest relying on contracts or on 
unfair competition law (Bently, 2018) 62. While it is 
difficult to ascertain the precise impact that this 
public-domain argument would have, it may well 
have a disadvantageous effect on investment. If 
developers doubt whether creations generated 
through AI qualify for copyright protection, what is 
the incentive to invest in such systems?63. 
 
Consequences of granting or denying protection 
 
Michaux (2018) draws attention to the difficulties 
in distinguishing works generated by humans and 
by machines, if AI-generated works are deprived of 
copyright protection. Strikingly, this problem would 
still exist if protection were granted on the basis of 
a different right. On the other hand, he predicts 
such protection could lead to a substantial increase 
in the number of protected works and in the 
concentration of copyright in a handful of 
Photographs which are not original may also be granted 
protection under national law. This neighbouring protection 
of photographs which are not original is permitted under 
Article 6 of Directive 2006/116/EC. It is implemented in 
some European countries. For instance, in Spain, limited 
protection of 25 years is granted to non-original pictures 
(see Article 128 of Spanish copyright law). A more 
generous term of 50 years is granted to non-original 
photographs in Germany, a provision that has been invoked 
to protect satellite images. Protection for non-original 
photographs obeys a different rationale linked to the 
commercial or documental value of these assets (Bondía, 
2006). 
62  Vid also the proposal of L. Szuskin cited in C. De Ganay and 
D. Gillot, 2017: 146. 
63  See Andres Guadamuz ‘AI and copyright’, WIPO Magazine, 
October 2017, WIPO, 
https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/05/article_0
003.html.  
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companies. Protection could lead to an 
instrumentalisation of the notion of work, and to 
excessive monetisation of access to works. 
 
Similar concerns have been expressed by Lauber-
Rönsberg (2019), who stresses that integration of 
AI-generated works in the copyright regime may 
profoundly disrupt the fundamentals of copyright 
legislation and the notions upon which the whole 
system is built. She recognises that the creation of 
an ad hoc right might better respond to the 
peculiarities of AI, but also expresses reservations 
about the requirements for triggering protection 
and rights allocation. Another obstacle she sees is 
that the mandatory/voluntary disclosure of the use 
of AI in a work or related matter might be very 
difficult to implement. 
 
Perry and Margoni (2010) warn about the constant 
erosion of the public domain, while Schönberger 
(2018) predicts the possible destruction of 
incentives for human creators if machine-
generated works are treated the same. 
 
(b) Patents 
 
Patentability of AI-generated inventions  
 
Fast-moving developments in technology have 
enabled AI to play an important role in innovation 
processes. AI may have the potential to increasingly 
marginalise human ingenuity and human input in 
new inventions (Ramalho, 2018). As in the case of 
copyright, the patentability of inventions generated 
by AI raises several questions for patent law. 
Although some jurisdictions seem to have been 
dealing with patents for inventions created by 
machines64, the subject is open to discussion. 
Should inventions created by AI be granted patents? 
If the answer is yes, to whom should inventorship 
be awarded for such AI-created inventions? 
 
In principle, nothing prevents the granting of 
patents for AI-generated inventions, provided they 
are for a patentable subject-matter. According to 
Article 52(1) of the EPC, European patents can be 
granted for any inventions that may have an 
industrial application, are new and involve an 
                                           
64  See Colin R. Davies ‘An evolutionary step in intellectual 
property rights — Artificial intelligence and intellectual 
property’, 2011, p. 608, referring to a patent granted in the 
US for a satellite communications antenna designed by an 
AI system. A recent article by Coulter, M. (2019) in the 
Financial Times mentions the patent applications filled by 
Professor Abbott at the UK, US and European patent 
offices for two inventions generated by  DABUS. 
65  Although a description of a person skilled in the art is 
provided for evaluating inventive step, there is no 
distinction made between the skilled person assessing 
inventive step and the skilled person assessing sufficiency 
inventive step (or in other words an invention shall 
not be obvious to a 'person skilled in the art' taking 
into account the ‘state of the art’, as mentioned in 
Article 56 EPC). In addition Article 83 stipulates that 
'an application shall disclose the invention in a 
manner for it to be carried out by a "person skilled 
in the art"'. The ‘person skilled in the art’ is a key 
issue for machine-generated inventions55, however 
the EPC does not give a definition of a ‘person 
skilled in the art’. This definition has instead been 
interpreted through case-law and various 
guidelines. In GL G-VII, 3, under the heading of 
inventive step65, a ‘person skill in the art’ is 
‘…presumed to be a skilled practitioner in the 
relevant field of technology, who is possessed of 
average knowledge and ability and is aware of 
what was common general knowledge in the art at 
the relevant date. He is also presumed to have had 
access to everything in the "state of the art", in 
particular the documents cited in the search report, 
and to have had at his disposal the means and 
capacity for routine work and experimentation 
which are normal for the field of technology in 
question…’. GL G-VII, 3 also says that ‘…there may 
be instances where it is more appropriate to think 
in terms of a group of persons, e.g. a research or 
production team, rather than a single person…’ 
Therefore, it has been argued that the possible use 
of AI as a tool (if its use was common in the field 
in question) needs to be taken into account when 
assessing the inventive step55. One effect of 
inventions involving AI and machine learning may 
thus be an increase in the level of skills and 
knowledge of the skilled person and thus an 
increase in the level of inventive step required66. 
This increase is not without problems, as 
highlighted by one commentator who argues that 
'the toughest problem may be how to determine 
the capabilities of a normal artificial intelligence 
tool, and more in particular, how examiners, patent 
attorneys and patent judges can establish whether 
the average skilled person equipped with that tool 
could and would create a specific product or 
process. Determining the reach of artificial 
intelligence is particularly difficult, because the 
output of an artificial intelligence application is 
hard to predict (Blok, 2017)'.  
 
of the description in the EPO Guidelines. See also 
‘COMPARATIVE STUDY REPORT ON TRILATERAL PROJECT 
12.6 REQUIREMENTS FOR DISCLOSURE AND CLAIMS’ 
available at: 
https://www.trilateral.net/wcm/connect/trilateral/9422775
b-52e8-41f9-b020-
9c71746a7120/Pro.%252012.6%25202007update%252
0final.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID= 
66  Presentation of Dr Argyrios Bailas/Dr Doris Thums of the 
EPO, given on 5 June 2018, entitled ‘Patentability of AI 
related inventions — The EPO perspective’. 
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As Ramalho reminds us (2018), the inventive step 
requirement is meant to prevent patent numbers 
from rising to undesirable levels by excluding 
obvious inventions. Inventions involving AI may 
challenge current practices in assessing 
inventiveness. Yet Ramalho does not call for 
amendments in the current law. Instead, she 
proposes the harmonisation of practices across 
different jurisdictions and calls upon patent offices 
to develop a common set of guidelines on the 
patentability of AI-generated assets (Ramalho, 
2018). The author suggests broadening the scope 
of analogous art taking the use of AI into account 
when assessing who is the person ‘skilled in the art’. 
She even suggests making the disclosure of the 
inventive process mandatory and taking secondary 
indicia into consideration, so to consider AI use as 
an indication of obviousness. All this would result in 
a more demanding patentability threshold.  
 
Concerns regarding patent numbers rising to 
undesirable levels (due to AI generated inventions) 
are also being somewhat met by projects 
attempting to algorithmically create and publicly 
publish all possible new prior art so that any of such 
output would no longer be patentable by others67. 
In addition, the enabling disclosure and industrial 
applicability (utility) requirements should prevent 
patenting AI-generated subject matter without any 
description of how it can be reduced to practice68. 
In the US, Samore maintains that once genetic 
programming (a branch of AI) enters into 
widespread use for designing particular devices, 
designs created with these tools should not be 
patentable because they should be considered as 
obvious. The author proposes a test consisting of 
four factors to assess whether genetic 
programming is in widespread use. The four factors 
are:  
 
1) was the invention actually designed by a 
genetic programme? 
2) what was the proportion of persons having 
ordinary skill in the art in the field with 
access to genetic programmes?  
3) what was the financial cost associated 
with using a genetic programme for this 
type of design?  
4) how long and how much effort was 
required to operate the necessary genetic 
programme? 
 
Finally McLaughlin (2018) proposes a framework 
that analyses the spectrum of human intervention 
to distinguish between patentable and 
unpatentable computer-assisted and computer-
generated inventions. According to this framework, 
when a computer-assisted invention lacks 
sufficient human intervention to constitute a 
connection (cf. ‘nexus’) to human inventorship, the 
computer assisted invention enters a zone of 
unpatentability. Although being unpatentable, it 
remains free to be protected in other areas of law 
such as trade-secret law. This framework is 
illustrated in the figure below taken from 
McLaughlin (2018).  
The discussion on inventorship through the lens of 
legal scholars 
For patentable AI-generated inventions, the 
question of inventorship also arises. Who should be 
listed as the inventor of the new asset? European 
                                           
67  See the 'All Prior Art'-project by Alexander Reben: 
https://areben.com/project/all-prior-art/ by 
However, the EPO GL indicate in G-IV, section 2 that 
‘Subject-matter can only be regarded as having been made 
available to the public, and therefore as comprised in the 
state of the art pursuant to Art. 54(1), if the information 
given to the skilled person is sufficient to enable him, at 
the relevant date (see G‑VI, 3) and taking into account the 
patent law does not provide a definition of 
inventorship, although there is a presumption that 
it belongs to a ‘natural person’. However, this 
common general knowledge in the field at that time, to 
practice the technical teaching which is the subject of the 
disclosure (see T 26/85, T 206/83 and T 491/99)’. It has 
therefore been argued that for the ‘All Prior Art’-prior art 
this enabling disclosure is missing (see Bernan (2016)).   
68  See also the WIPO’s background document on patents and 
emerging technologies. 
18 
presumption has not been seen as a great obstacle 
by scholars. Blok argues that patent law cannot and 
should not be interpreted in a way that allows AI 
systems to have the same position in patent law 
that human inventors have. Human input is 
inevitable in the inventive process, whether that is 
through selecting a specific AI application or 
creating a specific algorithm to solve a technical 
problem. Therefore, he argues that AI systems ‘are 
and should be treated as tools of inventors and 
skilled persons, instead of autonomous inventors’ 
(Blok, 2017). Shemtov takes a similar view. In a 
report commissioned by the EPO, he concludes that 
under patent law it is neither possible nor desirable 
in the current state of the art to designate AI 
systems as inventors (Shemtov 2019)69. The report 
maintains that, given the current state of the 
technology, it is highly unlikely that an invention 
involving AI will not involve a human actor that can 
be designated as inventor. He says the following: 
 
When it comes to a human actor that uses 
an AI system, whose identity may be 
inconsequential to the invention process, 
who simply uses a machine learning 
technique developed by another, the 
inventor may be the person who ‘tooled’ the 
AI system in a particular way in order to 
generate the inventive output. Hence, under 
such circumstances the person that carries 
out the intelligent or creative conception of 
the invention may be the one who geared 
up the AI system towards producing the 
inventive output, taking decisions in relation 
to issues such as the choice of the 
algorithm employed, the selection of 
parameters and the design and choice of 
input data, even if the specific output was 
somewhat unpredictable. 
 
Davies (2011) takes a contrasting view. In a unique 
proposal, he favours authorship and ownership 
being allocated to computers. However, he 
recognises that the creation of secondary rights 
may be needed to allow the original programmer to 
benefit from the exploitation of the programme. 
Allocation of ownership to the AI system would 
make it necessary to: (i) grant intelligent machines 
legal personality; and (ii) implement a series of 
measures (e.g. deposit or insurance schemes) to 
ensure that financial claims can be addressed in 
the event of responsibility proceedings. This 
approach goes far beyond the IP framework. In 
2017, the European Parliament invited the 
                                           
69  The author recalls that designating an AI system as 
inventor in an application for a European patent would lead 
to rejection in application of Article 81 and 90 of the EPC 
and Rule 19 of the EPC. 
European Commission to consider a specific legal 
status for robots, which could lead to recognising 
the legal personality of AI (EP 2017a). So far, this 
invitation has not been taken on board by the 
Commission or national legislators, with the 
exception of a debate started by the Estonian 
government70 and has received little support from 
legal scholars.   
 
Pearlman argues for the recognition of AI 
inventorship. He argues that this would be possible 
under a framework that ‘introduces an IP rights 
assignment regime like "work-for-hire" and 
"employed-to-invent" based on the nexus between 
the AI and the natural persons programming and/or 
using it’ (Pearlman, 2018). This would entail the AI 
being named inventor, but the rights being instantly 
awarded to the creator of the AI, the user of the AI, 
or to both creator and inventor as a joint invention 
(Pearlman, 2018). In the view of the author, 
recognising an AI system as an inventor is 
necessary to be consistent with the objectives of IP 
law, including serving the public interest in art and 
science advancements (Pearlman, 2018). 
 
Similarly, Abbott argues that rethinking the 
boundaries of patent law is a worthwhile endeavour 
that could allow the recognition of computers as 
inventors. This has the possibility to provide 
‘certainty to businesses, fairness to research, and 
promote the progress of science’ (Abbott, 2016). 
Abbott calls for the recognition of computers as 
inventors, yet shies away from assigning patent 
ownership to computers or AI systems. He 
maintains that anything a computer system 
generates should be automatically assigned to the 
computer’s owner, as that would be ‘most 
consistent with current ownership norms 
surrounding personal property (including both 
computers and patents)’ (Abbott, 2017). 
 
Yanisky-Ravid and Liu point out that we live in a 
new era of machines that are increasingly 
autonomous without humans being part of the 
actual inventive act. They argue that traditional 
patent law has therefore become ‘outdated, 
inapplicable and irrelevant with respect to 
inventions created by AI systems’ (Yanisky-Ravid & 
Liu, 2017). Yet in contrast to other scholars, they do 
not call for a change in the law, but for the 
complete abolition of patent protection for AI-
generated inventions. Rather than relying on 
traditional IP law, they say that AI-generated 
inventions could be protected by alternative tools, 
70  ‘Skype’s Homeland Grapples With Dilemma of Robot as 
Legal Person’, Bloomberg, 10.10.2017, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-
10/skype-s-homeland-grapples-with-dilemma-of-robot-
as-legal-person. 
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including but not limited to ‘first-mover 
advantages, social recognition of AIs, and 
alternative technologies that prevent infringement 
of rights’ (Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, 2017). 
 
What is the best reason for granting patents to AI-
generated inventions? 
 
Scholars discussing the eligibility of patents for AI-
generated inventions commonly assess this 
eligibility with reference to the main objectives of 
the patent system, including the overall net impact 
the patent would have on innovation, how the 
patent would lead to dissemination of information, 
and whether the patent would create incentives for 
creating new inventions (Firth-Butterfield and Chae, 
2018a). 
 
According to Hetman, granting patent protection to 
AI-generated inventions/works may create a series 
of negative outcomes, such as market 
concentration; restraining market entry of other 
new ventures; and reducing human incentives to 
create new inventions. At the same time, it can be 
said that patents on AI-generated assets may be a 
requirement for: (i) continued investments in AI; (ii) 
incentivising the dissemination of AI-generated 
inventions; and (iii) disclosing the usage of AI in the 
inventive process. Adjustments to the existing law 
may be necessary to recalibrate the system. These 
adjustments might include re-establishing 
inventorship for companies; reducing the duration 
of patent protection; and rethinking the 
requirements for patent specifications to make 
them more concise and easy to interpret (Lauber-
Rönsberg & Hetmank, 2019). Similarly, Blok (2017) 
considers that a 20-year patent may be excessive 
if AI systems are widely available. 
 
Others have argued that patenting AI-generated 
inventions by recognising computers as inventors 
could incentivise the further development of 
intelligent computers. Thus, Abbot maintains that 
granting patents could increase incentives to 
invent, while it ‘is true that a computer does not 
respond to financial incentives, but the entities who 
develop inventive machines do’ (Abbott, 2017). 
 
Fraser stresses the need for policymakers to 
recognise the possible challenges and benefits that 
AI-generated inventions can bring and the need to 
‘continuously examine these developments and 
their potential effects to ensure that the 
fundamental rationale and justifications for the 
patent system are being fulfilled’ (Fraser, 2016). 
 
In finding a solution for the protection of AI-
generated inventions, scholars have stressed the 
importance of acknowledging human responsibility 
for AI, as innovations completely lacking direction 
and supervision could have negative and 
unintended consequences. There is therefore 
always a need for a degree of human responsibility, 
and future discussions should address how to 
ensure transparency and accountability (Firth-
Butterfield and Chae, 2018a). 
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5 The interplay between IP and transparency and explainability 
The interplay between the implementation of 
transparency and auditability requirements (critical 
in the AI regulatory debate71) and the preservation 
of IP rights should also be taken into account72. As 
discussed in the report Artificial Intelligence: A 
European Perspective (Craglia et al. 2018), 
although transparency and explainability have 
become key issues in regulating AI, it is not yet clear 
what this would mean in terms of legal 
requirements73.  
The need for transparency or explainability is to 
some extent already present in IP law. As already 
discussed, Thus in patent law, as inventions seeking 
patent protection are to be clearly and sufficiently 
disclosed such that they can be reduced to practice. 
Under European copyright law, the lawful user of 
software is entitled to ‘observe, study or test the 
functioning of the program in order to determine 
the ideas and principles which underlie any element 
of the program’74. However, as highlighted by Noto 
La Diega (2018), the limited scope of the exception 
makes it of limited value to algorithm transparency. 
The author also remains sceptical about the 
provisions in the Trade Secrets Directive75 and the 
experimental-use defences in (UK) patent law.  
71 See the recently adopted Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy 
AI by the European Commission High Level Expert Group 
on Artificial Intelligence as well as the EC Communication 
‘Building Trust in Human-Centric Artificial Intelligence’, 
COM(2019) 168 final. 
It is worth recalling that non-ethical AI will probably also 
be excluded under Article 53(a) of the EPC, as it specifies 
that ‘European patents shall not be granted in respect of 
inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be 
contrary to “ordre public” or morality; such exploitation 
shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is 
prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the 
Contracting States’. 
72 As sustained by the American scholar Frank Pasquale 
‘trade secrecy, where it prevails, makes it practically 
impossible to test whether [engines of reputation, search, 
and finance’s] judgments are valid, honest or fair’ 
(Pasquale 2015: 217). 
73 In this sense, the Finnish AI strategy states that 
‘transparency, accountability and extensively notable 
societal benefit are held as its general principals. However, 
it has yet to be specified what these principles mean in 
practice from the viewpoint of various actors and 
regulatory systems’. 
74 Article 5.3 of the Software Directive. 
Article 3(1): ‘ The acquisition of a trade secret shall be 
considered lawful when the trade secret is obtained by […] 
(b) observation, study, disassembly or testing of a product
or object that has been made available to the public or that
is lawfully in the possession of the acquirer of the
information who is free from any legally valid duty to limit
the acquisition of the trade secret’. 
76 See also Recital 63 of the GDPR: ‘[…] A data subject should
have the right of access to personal data which have been
collected concerning him or her, and to exercise that right
easily and at reasonable intervals, in order to be aware of,
and verify, the lawfulness of the processing. Every data
subject should therefore have the right to know and obtain
The tension between explainability and proprietary 
rights is already present in the provisions of the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). It has 
been argued that the IP rights of the data controller 
may curtail the data subject’s right to access 
information — in particular the right to access 
‘meaningful information about the logic involved’ in 
automated decisions (Wachter et al. 2017)76. The 
Data Protection Working Party has also clarified, in 
relation to Article 15, that ‘companies cannot rely 
on trade secret protection as an excuse to deny 
access or refuse to provide information, and agreed 
with a case-by-case approach when balancing both 
rights’77. Malgieri and Comandé (2017) also note 
that the ‘mere disclosure of specific decisions 
rationales and information about auditing cannot 
be considered as adversely affecting proprietary 
assets of data controllers’. 
Recent guidelines and studies, while acknowledging 
this tension, do not detail the mechanisms that 
could be used to ensure that public and private 
interests of all the parties involved are sufficiently 
protected78. At the same time, clauses restricting 
access to source code and proprietary algorithms 
are being included in trade negotiation agreements 
communication in particular with regard to […]the logic 
involved in any automatic personal data processing and, at 
least when based on profiling, the consequences of such 
processing.[…]That right should not adversely affect the 
rights or freedoms of others, including trade secrets or 
intellectual property and in particular the copyright 
protecting the software. However, the result of those 
considerations should not be a refusal to provide all 
information to the data subject. […]’ Emphasis in underline 
is ours. 
77 ‘Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and 
Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679’, 17/EN, 
WP251rev.01.   
78 For a brief overview on how the interplay between 
transparency and IP is looked at in recent reports (in 
particular, Ethically Aligned Design (EAD1e), Responsible AI: 
A Global Policy Framework, and the OECD’s AI principles), 
see Meyer and Fernandez 2019.  
The Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI also briefly refer 
to this issue to clarify that ‘auditability entails the 
enablement of the assessment of algorithms, data and 
design processes. This does not necessarily imply that 
information about business models and intellectual 
property related to the AI system must always be openly 
available. Evaluation by internal and external auditors, and 
the availability of such evaluation reports, can contribute 
to the trustworthiness of the technology. In applications 
affecting fundamental rights, including safety-critical 
applications, AI systems should be able to be 
independently audited.’ 
A recent study by Castelluccia et al (2019) of the European 
Parliament on algorithmic decision-making systems (ADS) 
recommends that '…it should be made clear that reverse 
engineering for the purpose of analysing, explaining or 
detecting biases in automatic decision systems (ADS) 
should be considered lawful and should not be limited by 
trade secret, or more generally by intellectual property 
rights laws... 
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(Koene et al. 2019; Lee-Mkiyama H., 2018). The 
extent to which these and similar clauses may 
affect to transparency will depend on the detailed 
arrangements finally produced (Koene et al. 2019).  
Beyond this friction, it has been suggested that 
transparency or explainability can also help 
elucidate how outputs are generated by AI systems 
and therefore address questions related to the 
allocation of intellectual property rights and as well 
as empower users who are better informed about 
AI being used in a given system (Sturm et al. 2019). 
To a certain extent, explainable AI could also 
contribute to detect infringing uses of IP protected 
assets and overcome the challenge of determining 
if a given use is within or outside the scope of 
exclusive IP rights79.  
 
In light of the above, it is unquestionable that the 
IP dimension should be incorporated into the wider 
debate on: (i) the ethics and legal dimension of AI 
policies; and (ii) the specific tools and methods to 
develop trustworthy AI and an appropriate liability 
and safety framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
79  As highlighted by Vesala and Ballardini, 2019, while 
referring to copyright: “[…] another fundamental challenge 
specific to NNs is that the workings of neural networks are 
difficult even to explain and understand. It is therefore 
hard to determine whether or not reproduction or use takes 
place within an NN in any particular case”.  
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6 Conclusion 
AI strategies have so far paid little attention to the 
challenges that AI poses to the intellectual-property 
rights legal framework. However, the increasing 
importance of AI technologies and the gaps 
identified by scholars in both the copyright and 
patent system reveal the need for further 
investigation of these issues. 
On the patentability of AI, the EPO’s newly released 
guidance on patentability criteria for AI is to be 
welcomed. However, the protection of AI-generated 
works or inventions seems to be more problematic. 
In light of the humanistic approach to copyright law, 
it is questionable whether AI-generated works 
deserve copyright protection. On laws, although an 
AI-generated invention may be in principle a 
patentable subject-matter, the assessment of the 
inventive step or inventorship attribution also raise 
policy questions. 
Although some copyright scholars clearly advocate 
for AI-generated works to be placed in the public 
domain, others have put forward a series of 
proposals aiming at ensuring a certain level of 
protection. With notable exceptions, these 
proposals are still too vague. They do not always 
sufficiently detail the possible elements 
underpinning such protection. In particular, this 
would require laying down: (i) the requirements for 
the subject-matter to be protected; (ii) the scope 
and nature of the rights granted (What term? Which 
acts would require right holders authorisation? 
Which exceptions or limitations?); and (iii) the 
allocation of ownership (To the producer, the user 
or the robot? What about jointly created works?). 
There is no doubt that certain AI-generated 
creations/inventions may share the characteristics 
of information goods — non-excludable and non-
rivalrous in nature —. If there are no enough 
incentives for the production and 
commercialisation of those the creation of quasi-
monopolistic rights to foster innovation and 
commercialisation could be justified. However, 
concerns have been expressed about: (i) the need 
for incentives, especially in cases where the 
investment cost is low; and (ii) the consequences of 
granting such rights on the market, including on 
innovation and on creations or inventions made by 
humans (is there any other public interest needing 
special protection?). Would more property rights 
encourage or rather deter innovation? 
Before favouring one solution or another, further 
economic and legal research is needed to assess to 
what extent the creation of new rights is needed at 
all. Who is/will be producing AI-generated goods? 
How autonomous are inventive/creative machines? 
What impact might regulation have on the relevant 
stakeholders, including artistic and cultural 
workers? What are the consequences of protection 
or non-protection? How would disparities in 
legislation/practices affect European companies? 
Which legal models should be put in place to 
address shortcomings, if any? What would be the 
most efficient allocation of rights? 
It goes without saying that the response to these 
questions may vary depending on the IP rights to 
be considered. In particular, in relation to copyright, 
societal and philosophical considerations may also 
have an influence on how proper rules for a new 
era of authorship are shaped80. However, this 
dimension is far beyond the purposes of this paper. 
Last but not least, this paper argues for the 
incorporation of the IP dimension into the ethical 
and legal discussion about transparency and 
accountability to take into account the interests of 
the rightholders as well as of users and society at 
large. 
80 For an overview of the evolution of the notion of author 
and artistic practices along the years, and how laws and 
rules have reacted to those practices, see S. Dusollier 
2018.  
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